The Concept of God and the Problem of Evil [Part 2]

Introduction

During my last post on the concept of God and the problem of evil, I took up the task of defining evil. By way of review, I concluded that the following elements should be involved in defining evil:

1. Evil is part of reality, not merely an illusion
2. Evil is not a created thing, nor is it an individual substance, person, or force. 
3.  Evil cannot exist apart from the good (however, the reverse is not true, since we know of a good that must exist, by necessity, in every possible world—God, who is a necessary being and the supreme good); rather, it is parasitic on the good.
4. Since God created all things good and is neither the creator of nor cause of evil, we may speak of evil, then, to some extent, as the absence of the good. (Perhaps we might think of evil as in some way depriving the good.)

In this post I want to continue our discussion by looking, briefly, at just what the problem of evil is. 

The Problem(s) of Evil

In John S. Feinberg’s classic book, The Many Faces of Evil, he states as his first thesis “that there is no such thing as the problem of evil.” [1] Rather, there are various problems of evil. Following Feinberg, I’ll distinguish between three distinct kinds of problems. My purpose, here, is informative and introductory, rather than to provide an answer for each. 

First, one might make a distinction between the philosophical/theological problem of evil and the religious or existential problem of evil. The philosophical/theological problem of evil has to do with how we are to understand the existence of evil altogether. It seeks to answer questions pertaining to the origins and nature of evil. What is evil? Where did evil come from? If God exists, why would He allow evil? Is evil a real part of the world, or is it merely an illusion? The philosophical/theological problem also wrestles with the distinction between moral evils and natural evils. As noted on the previous post, moral evils have to do with certain evils caused by an agent (e.g., humans or angels); whereas natural evils are the kinds of evils brought about through natural events, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or mudslides. In addition to the kinds of evil, the philosophical/theological problem wrestles with the amount, intensity and apparent gratuitousness of evil. If God exists, then why does he allow the amount and intensity of evil that we see in the world? Does God have a justifying reason for doing so? Some evils, it seems, are rather pointless (gratuitous). Why are such evils necessary? There is also the problem of animal pain and the problem of Hell. All of these areas are considered to fall under the philosophical/theological problem of evil. [2] 

But what of the religious/existential problem of evil? Unlike the philosophical/theological problem, the religious/existential problem has to do more with one’s personal struggle with evil. Such a problem brings about a crisis of faith in the individual (or community); whereby, the person suffering from the evil tries to reconcile what’s happening with God’s goodness. She might ask questions such as, “Why is this happening to me?” “What did I do to deserve this?” “If God loves me, how could He allow this to happen to me?” [3]

The second kind or type of problem has to do with one’s concept of God and evil. One’s overall worldview plays a key part in, not only how one understands evil, but also in how one understands God’s relationship to the world and response to the evil in it. There are various theological systems in the world. People have differing conceptions of God’s goodness, power, knowledge, and other perfections. Pantheists will view the problem of god and evil differently than, say, a panentheist, deist, or theist might. Even among those within a certain worldview, such as Christian theism, there are different conceptions of God. Some Christian theists believe that God determines all things, while others recognize that humans have a great deal of freedom and responsibility in what happens in the world. In one sense, these two concepts of the Christian God’s relation to the world are radically different. Such a difference affects how one might answer the problem of evil. 

Third, and lastly, with respect to the philosophical/theological problem, there is the distinction between the logical problem from evil and the evidential problem from evil. The logical form of the problem [4] suggests that there is an apparent contradiction between the following set of propositions:

            [A] God is omnipotent

            [B] God is all-loving

            [C] Evil exists in the world

As David Hume put the objection, “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? [5]

The evidential problem [6] differs from the logical problem in that it is inductive in nature, relying heavily on probability. According to those promoting a form of the evidential problem from evil, while there may be no logical contradiction between the existence of God and evil in the world, evil, nevertheless, counts against God’s existence. [7]

Conclusion

In this post, I have not sought to answer any of the various problems of evil; rather, I have only provided a basic introduction to the issue. As the series progresses, I aim to go deeper with respect to some of the various problems discussed above. 

Notes

[1] John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil, revised and expanded edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004), 21.

[2] Ibid., 21-22.  

[3] Ibid., 21.

[4] Most atheists and theists agree that the logical problem from evil no longer poses a threat to Christian theists. This has to do in large part to the work of philosopher Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977).

[5] David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, second edition, edited by Richard H. Popkin (Hackett Publishing Co., 1998), X (p. 63). 

[6] For two varieties of evidential arguments, see “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” by William L. Rowe, and “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” by Paul Drapper, both found in The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996): 1-11 and 12-29. 

[7] Feinberg, 24.