Introduction
In
the next couple of posts, I want to begin right where we left off, examining
some of the theodicies often given by Christians and theists to answer why God
allows evil in the world. In this particular post, we’re going to examine the Punishment-for-sin
and Free-will theodicies. But before we do that, it may be helpful to take a
moment to distinguish between a theodicy and a defense.
Defense or Theodicy
Those
who are familiar with the POE know that there is a distinction between a
theodicy and a defense. Basically, a theodicy is given to justify why God
allows certain evils in the world. In a sense, a theodicy says, “this is the
(a) reason.” Those who prefer using a defense over a theodicy recognize that
theodicies often try to do too much. A defense is much more modest in its
approach. As Alvin Plantinga explains it, “the aim [of a defense] is not to say
what God’s reason is, but at most
what God’s reason might possibly be.”
[1]
As
one works out her own answers to the POE, it may be wise to take Plantinga’s
advice in recognizing the limitations of any particular theodicy for answering
why God allows evil in the world. But, perhaps, there is another way forward.
William Alston looks at the various theodicies a bit differently. He suggests
that we think of the various theodicies as “theodical suggestions” or “partial
possibilities” as to why God might allow certain evils. [2] No one theodicy can
fully justify God’s reasons for allowing the evils that He does, but taken
together, the various theodicies may serve to function as a kind of cumulative
case, giving a fuller range response as to why God allows certain pain and suffering
in the world.
Having
distinguished between a theodicy and a defense, and having put forth the
approach that we’re taking, here, a la
Alston, let’s proceed with the Punishment-for-sin.
Punishment-for-sin Theodicy
Perhaps
one of the reasons that some suffering exists in our world is out of God’s
punishment for sin. Because God is not only a loving God, but also a God who is
holy and just, God must put an end to certain sins. Unfortunately, as William
Alston remarks concerning the use of this theodicy, “The punishment motif has
tended to drop out of theodicies in our ‘soft-on-criminals’ and ‘depravity-is-a-disease’
climate, but it has bulked large in the Christian tradition.” [3]
With
respect to this theodicy, one word of caution is due. Some Christians have spoken
up during certain tragedies suggesting that the reason for such occurrences was
out of God’s judgment (here I’m thinking of instances like 911 or hurricane
Katrina). While it may be the case that God brings judgment on certain
individuals or peoples, apart from divine revelation, it is beyond our ken to
know exactly when this is the case.
Some
might object to this theodicy, pointing out that certain sins often do not meet
their proper punishment. But as Alston retorts, “we are often in a poor
position to assess the degree and kind of a certain person’s sinfulness, or to
compare people in this regard.” [4] Alston also reminds us that it is our
inward sins that are more serious than our outward behaviors, the greatest of
which is a person’s self-centeredness, failing to live with God at the center
of one’s life. [5]
But,
as with all theodicies, this one does not tell us why God allows all of the
evils and suffering that He does. Let’s turn, now, to the free will theodicy.
Free-will Theodicy
The free-will theodicy was first proposed by St. Augustine
of Hippo and has been championed by Christians for quite some time, now. Put
briefly, the free-will theodicy says that God saw that it was better to create human
creatures with free will than to create creatures without such freedom. If
human creatures are truly free, then it is logically impossible for God to create
them as free, and yet determine them to make some morally significant choice.
In the words of Plantinga,
"If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or casual laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t. It is within his power, at the time in question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it." [6]
If God creates such a world with morally free creatures,
then it is the case that if such creatures are capable of performing actions
that are morally good, then so it is that those creatures are also capable of
performing actions that are morally evil. As it turns out, this is exactly the
kind of world that God has created, one with morally free creatures. Sadly those
creatures rebelled against God, bringing about great amounts of evil in the
world.
So the free-will theodicy goes. But not everyone is pleased
with the Free-will theodicy. One common objection asks why God couldn’t have created
human creatures such that they always do that which is right. There are several
problems with this objection. First, it assumes that such a thing is a
metaphysical possibility, that is to say, that God creating creatures to always
do right is something that could happen in the actual world. While it might be logically possible for God to create a world
such that His creatures always perform actions that are morally good, it is
doubtful whether such a world is metaphysically
possible. To demonstrate this point, take the following example. It is logically
possible that I can swim the Atlantic Ocean; yet, metaphysically, this seems to
be impossible, since I don’t have the right kind of equipment in my human
makeup to perform such a feat. We are not dealing, here, with what is logically
possible, but only with that which could obtain in an actual world. If humans
are free in the sense we’ve been describing, then it is not up to God or anyone
else to make some morally significant choice; rather, it is up to the person
who has the capacity to perform such an act.
Part of the confusion stems from a false understanding of
creation and what obtains within creation. As Plantinga makes clear,
"Indeed, God did not bring into existence any states of affairs at all. What He did was to perform actions of a certain sort—creating the heavens and the earth, for example—which resulted in the actuality of certain states of affairs. God actualizes states of affairs. He actualizes the possible world that does in fact obtain; He does not create it. And while He has created Socrates, He did not create the state of affairs consisting of Socrates’ existence." [7]
In other words, while God is responsible for creating the world that exists, which includes the heavens and the earth, He is not responsible for everything that occurs within it. Plantinga is drawing on modal logic, the idea that there are an infinite number of possible worlds. Things could have been differently than how they are. The world that obtained, however, is the actual world, and it is just one of an infinite number of possible worlds that could have been. Let me see if I can flesh this out a bit by means of an example. In the actual world, that is the world that we live in, my mother and father were married and had me. But there could have been a different world, a possible world such that my mother never married my dad. In that world there would have been no person named Ronnie Campbell born of Drema Phillips and Paul Campbell. But that’s not the world that obtained. The actual world is the world that obtained and includes my mother and father marrying and having a son, who is identical with the person writing this post. [8] So, in a sense, human creaturely freedom is partly responsible for how the world turned (and is turning) out.
So, given all that’s been said, here, the free will theodicy
suggests that God is not the one responsible for the moral evils that we see in
the world; rather, human beings who have the capacity to perform morally
significant acts are the culprits. There are some issues and limitations with
the free will theodicy, however. While the free-will theodicy explains moral
evils, how are we to understand natural evils caused by things such as
hurricanes or tsunamis? What about animal death?
As noted in the previous blog post, some Christians believe
that all moral and natural evil is a result of the fall of humanity into sin.
Others think that, perhaps, fallen angels are behind much of the natural
disasters and natural evils we see taking place in the world. If one holds to the former, then
one would answer the problem of both moral and natural evil under the free will
theodicy. But this position is far from obvious and is not held by all
Christians, especially Christians convinced that animal death preceded the
fall. What of the second view? The fallen angel view might explain why natural evils exist in the world
and would work well with the free will theodicy, since God, for all we know,
may have given fallen angels a certain amount of freedom, like He did with His
human creatures. But not all Christians agree, and, perhaps, most are skeptical
of the view that fallen angels are behind every natural disaster or death of an
animal that takes place in the world, though such supernatural beings might be behind some
of such occurrences.
Concluding Thoughts
At
best, all that we can conclude at this point is that the punishment-for-sin and
the free will theodicy exist as live possibilities, accounting for some of the
suffering that takes place in the world.
In
the next couple of posts, I aim to look at some additional theodicies, such as
the soul-making theodicy, the natural-order theodicy, and William Dembski’s
retro-causation theodicy, wrapping up my series on the Concept of God and the problem of evil.
Notes
[1]
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1977), 28.
[2]
William P. Alston, “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive
Condition,” in The Evidential Argument
from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1996), 103.
[3]
Ibid., 103.
[4]
Ibid., 104.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Plantinga, 29.
[7]
Ibid., 39.
[8]
Ibid. For a fuller explanation, I would highly recommend reading God, Freedom, and Evil, 29-64.
